Knowledge Base
New Methods of Intrusion Detection using Control-Loop Measurement
Fourth Technology for Information Security Conference'96 (TISC'96), May 16, 1996, Houston, TX
Dr. Myron L. Cramer
James Cannady
Jay Harrell
This paper describes a new concept in network intrusion detection based up
statistical recognition of an intruder's control-loop. These criteria offer
advantages in infinite networks and where a priori attack scenarios are not
known. This paper describes the need for better intrusion detection methods,
the applicability of digital signal processing to real-time network
surveillance, the concept of control-loop behavior, and the design of an
innovative intrusion detection system employing these. We also discuss the
benefits of this new system in comparison with alternative technologies.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to describe some new ideas in intrusion
detection. These ideas are based upon a review of the physics of the problem
and an analysis of applicable technological approaches. The proposed new
methods reflect concepts still in development and evaluation by the authors.
This paper includes discussion of the need for better Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), Intrusion Detection System Operational Concepts, Applicability
of Digital Signal Processing (DSP) to Intrusion Detection System design,
Control-Loop Concepts, Use of the above in an Intrusion Detection System, and
the benefits of this approach.
Role of Intrusion Detection
As illustrated in Figure 1, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can be
viewed as the second layer of protection against unauthorized access to
networked information systems. It is believed that no reasonable access
control system can preclude intrusions. Despite the best access control
systems, intruders are still able to enter computer networks with greater
frequency than anyone would like. IDSs augment the security provided by the
access control systems by providing system administrators with warning of the
intrusion and information to assist in damage control or mitigation. Although
IDSs can be designed to verify the proper operation of access control systems
by looking for the attacks that get past the access control systems, this
second layer is a most useful when it can detect intrusions that use methods
that are different from those looked for by the access control systems.
To do this they must use more general and more powerful methods than simple
data base look-ups of known attack scenarios. An effective intrusion
detection is necessary to cue response options.

Figure 1. Intrusion Detection Systems are the Second Layer of Defense
Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems
In order to satisfy its functions, the ideal intrusion detection system should have the following characteristics:
Ideal IDS Characteristics
| Timeliness: | It should detect intrusions either while they are happening or shortly afterwards. | | High probability of detection: | It should recognize all or most intrusions. | | Low false-alarm rate: | It should have a low number of false intrusion alarms.
| | Specificity: | In identifying attacks, it should give sufficient characterization data to support an effective response.
| | Scalability: | It should be applicable to large (infinite) networks.
| | Low a priori information: | It should requires a minimum of a priori information about potential attackers and their methods.
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Although these characteristics appear compelling, they have not been available, nor are
they likely to result from traditional approaches. The performance of IDSs can
be described in various ways. In evaluating the performance of IDSs as they
become available, quantitative performance metrics will be useful. In the
simplest level, there are three fundamental classes of metrics which could be
used, quantity, quality, and time, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Performance Metrics for IDSs include Quantity, Quality, and
Time
Quantitative metrics include the number of nodes protected, the number
of user profiles tracked, the number of simultaneous attacks that can be
tracked, and the number system administrators supported. The number of
simultaneous attacks is significant in light of attack strategies which include
the use of large feint attacks intended to distract responses from the real
attacks.
Scope of Intrusion Detection Systems
The Scope of an IDS includes the types and quantities of systems to be
supported, the types of threats or attackers considered, the types of intrusion
activities addressed by the system. Some systems may be designed primarily for
insider threats: they monitor user activities and ensuring that they remain
within norms. Other systems may focus on backing up the access control systems
and ensure that specified attack scenarios are not able to enter the
networks.
System to be Protected: The protected system can be an individual
machine or a network of machines. Problems arises in trying to protect a
network by installing individual protection on each machine in the network.
These problems include configuring, managing, monitoring, and coordinating
distributed intrusion detection activity. In many instances, protecting the
network can be more important than protecting some of the individual
processors!
Attackers: There are wide differences in the types of possible threats.
The degrees of threats can range from the recreational hacker to the
full-scale "Type II Information Warfare Attack" directed and focused, and in
some instances funded by national government or well-resourced organizations.
Objectives of attacks may include attempts to compromise confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, or the availability of services.
Classification of IDSs
The "standard" classifications of IDSs includes the following
categories: statistical anomaly detection, rule-based anomaly detection, and
rule-based penetration identification. The new methods discussed in this
paper do not fit in any of these categories! For this reason we need to take a
fresh perspective on system designs and we introduce a different way to think
of system design approaches.
In this new view, IDSs can be characterized by: where they live, what you have
to tell them, what they look for, which technologies they use, and what they
tell you. We discuss these in the following paragraphs.
Where they live... There are several choices of hosts for an IDS as
depicted in Figure 3 below. These include the standard network elements
including routers, hubs, servers, and client systems.

Figure 3. Possible hosts for an IDS Include Many Network Locations
The first possible host for an IDS is on the computer(s) being
protected. This poses scaling problems for large networks, as well as
installation, configuration, and management issues for distributed IDS
operation. It also suffers from the worst visibility of related network
activity. On the positive side, however, it does have the best visibility of
the IDS host computer.
Another and potentially better IDS host is a separate processor strategically
attached to the network. This approach has advantages for large networks,
including installation, configuration, management. It also has the best
visibility of the overall network.
What you have to tell them ... The fundamental problem is the detection
criteria for an "intrusion". This can include scenarios of attack or
penetration based upon historical information, normal user profiles, and
expected system usage patterns.
What they look for ... In looking for intrusions, an IDS examines
records such as computer log files which give historical usage data, or ongoing
process activity information from the operating system for real-time intrusion
detection. These systems then look for matches with either known scenarios of
attack or penetration; or the look for anomalies with anticipated user or
system profiles. A good criteria needs to be predictive! This includes the
recognition of novel attacks and methods.
Recognizing Intrusions
The fundamental problem in IDS design is really how to recognize the
behavior associated with intrusions. A determined attacker effects his
intrusion through a sequence of activities to achieve a desired result.
Generally, each of these actions, viewed by itself is a normal legitimate
activity. It is only when the sequence of an attack is assembled that the
intruder's hostile objectives become clear.
Intrusions can come in many ways. Consider the type of intruder in Figure 4
who is conducting a systematic focused attack on a network over the Internet.
Although this is not the only type of intruder, this is potentially one of the
most dangerous. He has a source from which he is attempting to accomplish his
malicious objectives using some initial knowledge of the target system. From
his entry point, he will select specific elements in the targeted network; he
will have some specific actions he intends to effect; and he will utilize some
specific methods some of which we may have never seen before.
| Sources | Targets |
| Objectives | Actions |
| Knowledge | Methods |
Figure 4. The Class of Focused External Attackers is of Special Interest
Which technologies they use ...
Technologies for IDS typically include Data Base Methods and Expert systems such as Rule-based, Case-based, or Neural networks. Another class of technologies includes Digital Signal Processing (DSP). DSP methods include both digital filters, and spectrum analysis.
A good method needs to be adaptable!
Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
Digital signal processing is a technology-driven field. It typically
includes methods of processing discrete-time signals or time series data
sequences. These include digital filters and spectrum analysis.
In assessing new potentially applicable technologies for intrusion detection,
it is our premise that DSP is one with potentially high payoffs. DSP is widely
used in many applications in electrical and computer engineering, including
modern control systems, sensors and communications. Using modern statistical
methods, time-series data are collected, filtered, correlated, and analyzed for
many purposes including event detection. The recognition and characterization
of computer network protocols has been among the applications successfully
handled by DSP.
Time Series Data
Network traffic includes time series data in the form of
structured sequences of ones and zeros. As shown below in Figure 5, the time
series data contains patterns that implement the structures of the various
nested protocols carrying the network traffic. Applying DSP methods to this
traffic includes integrating time-series data streams with digital models
designed to correlate or weight activities of interest and to filter out
uninteresting activities, which may be combinations of external addresses and
certain combinations of processes.
01111110 11000000 XXXXXXXX (INFO) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 01111110 SLP
01111110 10000000 XXXXXXXX (INFO) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 01111110 SLP
01111110 11110000 XXXXXXXX (INFO) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 01111110 MLP
01111110 11100000 XXXXXXXX (INFO) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 01111110 MLP
Figure 5. Network Traffic Can Be Viewed as a Time Series
Protocol Analysis
Statistical signal processing is one method of DSP that can be used to
decompose protocol structures. In Figure 6 below we see that the HDLC and
DDCMP protocols have recognizable features when viewed in the bispectrum
generated through Cyclostationary Signal Processing. Cyclostationary Signal
Processing is a powerful statistical method that identifies characteristics in
time series autocorrelations. The independence of these features is
illustrated below showing the combined presence of HDLC and DDCMP.

Figure 6. Protocols Can Be Statistically Recognized Credit: Booz,
Allen & Hamilton Inc.
Control Loop Measurement
The methods of DSP provide a powerful new tool in the recognition of
patterns in network activity. This tool can implement general intrusion
criteria. The authors believe that these include the concept of Control Loop
Measurement.
Hypothesis: There is a new intrusion detection criteria utilizing
the signature of an intruder's control-loop. A control-loop is
characterized by both observability (surveillance) in conjunction with
controllability (process accesses and system calls). We illustrate how to
quantify this control and how to apply the resulting measure to discriminate
intruders from normal activities.
Control-Loop Detection
The field of Control Theory in electrical engineering includes the
concepts of Observability and Controllability. Within this theory, a control
system compares observations of a system's state with desired states to
generate corrections intended to steer the system being controlled toward the
desired state. As shown in Figure 7 below, it is our premise that the
activities of a focused external intruder can be viewed as a control loop.

Figure 7. A Focused External Attacker Utilizes a Control Loop
As shown in this figure, an attacker's network activities are
characterized by observability (surveillance) in conjunction with
controllability (process access and system calls). We believe that "high
control behavior" provides a useful metric for discriminating interesting
activities that may be useful in recognizing intruders. We also believe that
high control behavior can be statistically detected in the
bi-directional data flows using the tools of DSP.
Functional Concept
The functional concept of a system using the new methods discussed above
is illustrated in Figure 8 below. The system concept includes a sequence of
processes acting on network traffic serving to generate real-time activity
spectra.

Figure 8. A System Functional Concept Implements Control Loop
Measurement
Operational Concept
The Control Loop Measurement functional concept can be implemented in
several obvious ways. The notional figure below illustrates an implementation
in a DSP board plugged into a slot in a main router. This implementation may
be attractive for some installations due to the visibility it gives the IDS
over all external traffic.

Figure 9. A Router-Based Implementation of Control Loop Measurement
What they tell you ... Likely outputs from a Control Loop Measurement
IDS include Spectral analysis and presentations of high degrees of
observability and controllability, the instantaneous distribution of external
connections, internal distribution of significant correlated connections, and
scale indicators of suspicious activity.
Benefits
In this paper we have discussed a concept and rationale for a class of
new methods of intrusion detection. Potential benefits of these new methods
include higher detection probability, lower false alarm rate, more timely
warning (real-time), lower processing burden, lower management burden, reduced
demand for a priori data, more secure, less cumbersome, wider applicability,
and better coverage zones.
Summary
Our paper presented a summary of the needs for advanced intrusion
detection systems. This reflects the growing recognition of the inherent
penetrability of any networked computer system. The objective of any intrusion
detection system is to generate alarms and warning data whenever likely
break-ins are suspected. The ideal intrusion detection system is timely, has a
high probability of detection, low false-alarm rate, provides useful attack
characterization data, and is scaleable to large (infinite) networks such as
the Internet. Additionally, it must operate with a minimum of a priori
information about potential attackers and their methods.
Digital Signal Processing (DSP) is in wide use in many applications of
electrical and computer engineering, including modern control systems, sensors
and communications. Using modern statistical methods, time-series data is
collected, filtered, correlated, and analyzed for many purposes including event
detection. The recognition and characterization of computer network protocols
has been among the applications successfully handled by DSP. We illustrated
these methods with selected examples.
A determined attacker effects his intrusion through a sequence of activities to
achieve a desired result. Each of these actions, viewed by itself may be a
normal legitimate activity. It is only when this sequence is assembled that
the intruder's hostile objectives become clear. The core of the intrusion
detection problem is how to recognize this behavior. We described a new
criteria based upon detection of the intruder's control-loop. In general, a
control-loop is characterized by both observability (surveillance) in
conjunction with controllability (process launches and system calls). We
illustrated how to quantify this control and how to apply the resulting measure
to discriminate intruders from normal activities.
Finally we described the use of Control-Loop detection in an intrusion
detection system and describe its benefits over alternative technologies.
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